Telford v. Pardons : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
Telford v. Pardons : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Travis Telford; Pro Se.
Sharel S. Reber, Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondent.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Telford v. Pardons, No. 20000807 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2905
^ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Travis Edward Telford 
Petitioner/Appellant 
Vs. 
Board of Pardons 
Respondent/Appellee 
Case no. 20000807-CA 
Priority No. 3 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
On Appeal from Judgement of the 
Third Judicial District in and 
For Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable L. A. Dever 
District Court Judge 
TRAVIS E. TELFORD 
Petitioner/Appellant 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Published opinion requested 
No oral argument requested 
SHAREL S. REVER #7966 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF #4666 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent/Appelle 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857 o i p, 
U 
JAN 3 0 2G0^  
Table of Authorities 
1. Foote v. Board of Pardons 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991) 
2. Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 193) 
3. Padilla v. Utah Bd of Pardons and Parole 947 P.2d 644 (1997) 
4. Preece v. House 848 P.2d 163 (Utah App 1993) Cert granted 853 P.2d 
(Utah 1993) 
5. Solem v. helm 463 U.S. 272 
6. United States v. Barker 771 F.2d 1362 (1985) 
7. United States v. Heubal 864 F.2d 1104 (3rd Cir 1989) 
8. 5th Amendment United States Constitution 
9. 8th Amendment United States Constitution 
10. Article V Section 1 Utah State Constitution 
11. Article VII Section 12 Utah State Constitution 
12.Article VIII Section 1 Utah State Constitution 
ii 
Table of Contents 
Page 
Table of Authorities ii 
Nature of Appeal and Basis of Jurisdiction 1 
Issues on Appeal 1 
Argument 3 
I. The Trial Court, followed established case law that violates the 8th 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 9 
of the Utah State Constitution, in deciding if the Board actions violate 
Article V Section 1 of the Utah State Constitution, the separation of 
powers clause. 
n. When the Trial Court followed established case law in concluding that 
the Board could rely on evidence of Telford's contempt of in 
determining his parole date did not properly consider that Telford 
legally invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege not to give evidence 
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Argument 
I. The Trial Court, followed established case law that violates the 8th 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 9 
of the Utah State Constitution, in deciding if the Board's actions 
violate Article V Section 1 of the Utah State Constitution, the 
separation of powers clause. 
The decision issued by the Honorable Judge L.A. Dever, relied on the case 
of Padilla v. Utah Bd of Pardons and Parole 947 P.2d 664 (1997) to deny the 
petitioners argument that the decision of the Board of Pardons and Parole, in 
applying the sentence and release guide lined for Utah, violates Article V 
Section 1, the separation of powers clause, of the Utah State Constitution. 
In the decision of Padilla the court ladled this type of argument 
"flawed", stating that the court's power to sentence and the Board's power to 
pardon and parole "are two separate and distinct powers, neither of which 
invades the province of the other" Id at 669. 
The appellant is not challenging the Board's power to pardon, which 
is to set aside a conviction, or their power to parole, which is a shortening of 
a sentence. The appellant is however challenging the action of the Board in 
applying the sentencing guidelines, which is not pardoning or paroling, it is 
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sentencing and the application of the sentence and release guidelines is when 
a criminal defendant is given a prepositional sentence, a sentence that 
reflects his or her culpability in a crime and his or her past actions. The 
issuing of a sentence that is proportional to a criminal defendants culpability 
and past actions was mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of 
Solem v. Helm 463 U.S. 272. The decision in Padilla goes against this 
proportionality in sentencing for as it states in Padilla: 
"By its very term, the "indeterminate" sentence shall continue until 
the maximum period expires unless the Board, in its discretion 
terminates or commutes the punishment or pardons the offender. " 
Idat669 
So the court that issued the decision in Padilla failed to take into account the 
8th Amendments prohibitions against unproportional sentences and they have 
stated that an indeterminate sentence shall run until the maximum period of 
time has expired. For this to happen the sentencing Judge would have had to 
sentence each and every criminal defendant to the maximum period of time 
allow by law. This would be the exact same practice that was prohibited by 
the decision in United States v. Barker 771 F.2d 1362 (198) and this was 
argued by the appellant in he original brief in front of this court, yet the State 
failed to respond to this argument in their response. 
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The way to issue a proportional sentence to a criminal offender is 
through the sentence and release guidelines, which is definitively a 
sentencing function. By the Board of Pardons applying these guidelines in 
Utah they are practicing a sentencing function, as pointed out in Labrum v. 
Utah State Board of Pardons 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993); Foote v. Board of 
Pardon 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991); Preece v. House 848 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 
1993) cert granted 853 P.2d 89 (Utahl993) and sentencing is a core judicial 
function that can only be practiced by an Article VIE Judge. 
Since the decision in Padilla is constitutionally flawed the decision 
made by the Honorable Judge L.A. Dever is also constitutionally flawed and 
they should both be overturned by the Court and this Court should issue a 
decision, which is not constitutionally flawed. 
n. When the Trial Court followed established case law in concluding that 
the Board could rely on evidence of Telford's contempt of court in 
determining his parole date did not properly consider that Telford 
legally invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege not to give evidence 
against himself and is being unduly punished for what the constitution 
clearly allows him to do. 
When the Board of Pardons issued the sentence to Telford they 
departed form the sentence and release guidelines by over 200 months. The 
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reason cited for this departure were "Court finding of Contempt for refusal 
to testify at co-defendants trial and aggravating factor." As pointed out by 
the Appellant in his brief of this matter, and the Attorney for the Appellee, 
Shafel S. Reper, in an Affidavit in the Addendum of the Brief of Appelle, 
there is not a letter, order, or judgement for the charge of contempt in the 
Boards file for Telford. This is most likely due to the fact that the Honorable 
Judge Ben Hadfield, who in his full intimate knowledge of the law, knew 
that punishing Telford for invoking his constitutional rights is inherently 
unconstitutional. For it would go against the decision in United States v. 
Heubal 864 F.2d 1004 (3rd Cir 1989) where the U.S. Court of Appeals 
stated; 
"However, we today reaffirm the principal we set out in Garcia: where 
a defendant invokes his or her Fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in a timely manner, a sentencing court may not use his 
or her failure to waive that right as negative evidence to penalize him 
or her in deciding upon the appropriate sentence." Id at 1111 
But, the law like the Honorable Judge Ben Hadfield, has in fact 
punished Telford for legally invoking his constitutional rights which is 
inherently unconstitutional. For Telford did have the legal right to invoke his 
Fifth Amendment privilege, because even in these privileges were based on 
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the murder that he was convicted for, the murder was most likely not the 
only crime that took place that day, and Mr. Telford would still be subject to 
prosecution for these crimes, Therefore, Mr. Telford would have the legal 
right to invoke his Fifth Amendment Privileges and is being punished by the 
Board of Pardons for doing so. 
This action of the Board does violate the separation of power clause, 
for by using this factor they have deemed it appropriate to prosecute Mr. 
Telford for this action which is the job of the Attorney General's office for 
the State of Utah, The Board has reviewed evidence and passed verdict that 
Mr. Telford is guilty of the crime of contempt, which is the job of a jury, and 
the Board has passed sentence on Mr. Telford for this crime of contempt, 
which is the job of an Article VIII Judge. These actions cannot be practiced 
by someone who is a duly appointed official under Article VII Section, the 
separation of powers clause, and this factor cannot be used adversely against 
Mr. Telford in sentencing like the Board of Pardons has done for this type of 
action was forbidden by the decision in Heubal. 
IE. The Trial Court, following established case law, incorrectly concluded 
that the Board's imposition of a parole date in excess of State 
Guidelines does not violate substantive or procedural due process 
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Weather the Board violates substantive due process rights by 
imposing a parole date which exceeds the sentencing guidelines was decided 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Preece v. House 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994) 
Preece held that, "so long as the period of incarceration decided upon by the 
board of pardons falls within an inmate's applicable indeterminate range, 
e.g. five years to life, then that decision, absent unusual circumstances, 
cannot be arbitrary and capricious, 886P.2d at 512 Emphasis added. 
Accordingly the trial court incorrectly concluded Telford's substantive due 
process rights were not violated by the Board's decision to set March 2018 
as his parole re-hearing date, for there are unusual circumstances 
surrounding this decision and therefore makes this decision arbitrary and 
capricious. For as already pointed out the Board used Telford's invocation of 
his Fifth Amendment privileges adversely against him, which violates the 
precedence of HeubaL 
If as the State puts forth in their rebuttal on page 10 that "Procedural 
due process is met where an inmate is provided timely knowledge of the 
information (or summary there of) that the Board will consider, which in 
turn provides him with a reasonable opportunity to prepare a response and/or 
a rebuttal. Labrum 870 P.2d 909" Id page 10 Brief of Appelle. Then Mr. 
Telford was denied these procedural due process rights as attested to in the 
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Affidavit of Sheril Reber, Attorney for Appelle, which is in the Addendum 
of the Brief of Appelle, in which Ms. Reber states that there is no order of 
contempt in Mr. Telford's Board file. If there is neither a letter or and order 
of contempt in the board file that Mr. Telford could not have been duly 
informed that it would be used against him and he was not able to duly 
prepare a defense or rebuttal to this factor that the Board of Pardons used 
adversely against him. This is against the procedural due Process protection 
outlined in Labrum and cited to by the State in their brief. 
Conclusion 
The trial court's order dismissing the petition should be overturned. 
Since the case law used to dismiss this petition is constitutionally flawed. 
The trail court's order dismissing the petition should also be 
overturned because the Board impermissibly used a factor adversely against 
the petitioner that is not permitted by the constitution and established case 
law, and the petitioner was not informed that this factor would be used 
against him by the board. 
Mr. Telford should be issued a determinate sentence, by an Article 
Vin Judge that complies with his original sentence and release guidelines 
that is constitutional. 
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Mr. Telford does request a published opinion. Oral argument is not 
needed unless deemed necessary by the Court for which Mr. Telford would 
need counsel appointed to him. 
Dated on this day of 2001 
Travis E.Telford 
Attorney Prose 
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